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The Importance
of Individual Differences
in Grapheme-Color Synesthesia
In this issue of Neuron, Hubbard et al. show individual
differences in how grapheme-color synesthetes per-
form on cognitive tasks. Importantly, these behavioral
differences were correlated with fMRI measures. Such
individual differences have important ramifications
for synesthesia research. If individual differences are
ignored, then synesthesia research will be charac-
terized by erroneous conclusions and failures to rep-
licate.
When a person with grapheme-color synesthesia views
a black digit or letter, he or she sees the black graph-
emes just as we do but also experiences highly specific
colors (Dixon et al., 2000; Mattingley et al., 2001; Gros-
senbacher and Lovelace, 2001; Smilek and Dixon,
2002). For example, when the synesthete J looks at dif-
ferent letters such as S, A, and E, she knows the letters
are in black, but viewing the S leads to an experience
of “medium-dark green,” viewing the A leads to an ex-
perience of “slightly dark red,” and viewing the E leads
to an experience of “brown with a reddish orange tint.”
In a website documenting her synesthetic experiences,
J relates, “I actually see these colors projected onto
each of the letters when I look at them” (Emerson,
2005). The synesthete C describes her synesthetic col-
ors in a similar fashion. Although she has different col-
ors for these particular letters, her colors are just as
specific, and when describing how she experiences
these colors she tells us that her colors are experi-
enced “out there on the page.” We call these synes-
thetes projectors—a label that alludes to their photisms
being perceived in external space (see also Cytowic,
2002). In their article, Hubbard, Arman, Ramachandran,
and Boynton refer to these synesthetes as “lower”
synesthetes.The subjective reports of synesthetes whom we have
interviewed, however, suggest that not all grapheme-
color synesthetes experience synesthetic colors in the
same way. In fact, only a minority of synesthetes (ap-
proximately 10%) experience their synesthetic colors in
external space. The majority of synesthetes whom we
have interviewed use phrases like “in my mind’s eye”
or “in my head” to convey how (and where) they experi-
ence their synesthetic colors. For these synesthetes,
their colors are perceived internally with no hint of the
projected quality of the colors that C and J perceive.
Their experience can be likened, at least in part, to that
of a nonsynesthete viewing a black and white pho-
tograph of a spruce tree. We “know” that the needles
of a spruce tree are a highly specific shade of dark
green and can readily form an image of this color in our
mind’s eye, but we do not project this color onto the
photograph. We call these synesthetes associators, be-
cause their descriptions of their experiences reflect a
strong association between graphemes and specific
colors. In their article, Hubbard et al. (2005) refer to
these synesthetes as “higher” synesthetes.
Although individual differences among synesthetes
had been acknowledged in the literature, there has
been little systematic study of these differences. In fact,
there has only been one empirical study that has sys-
tematically documented these differences (Dixon et al.,
2004). In general, studies of synesthesia are based on
the assumption that synesthetes are a homogenous
group of individuals. This is what makes the Hubbard
et al. study so timely and important. By combining be-
havioral and neuroimaging techniques, Hubbard et al.
provide strong evidence in support of the idea that
there are important and stable individual differences
among synesthetes. In order to fully understand the im-
portance of this study, one needs to briefly survey
where recent research on grapheme-color synesthesia
has come from, and where it is heading.
Synesthesia has a long research history. Many pa-
pers were published in the 1920s, when introspection
was an accepted and popular method of enquiry. With
the rise of behaviorism, came the decline of synesthe-
sia research. In the 1990s, and especially since the turn
of the century, there has been a renaissance of research
on synesthesia, with many high-profile researchers
publishing their data in the very best journals. Arguably,
much of this recent work was devoted to establishing
that grapheme-color synesthesia is a “real” phenome-
non that is perceptual in nature, not simply a memory
association between graphemes and colors. A survey
of recent titles clearly reveals this general theme (e.g.,
“The perceptual reality of synesthetic color” [Palmeri et
al., 2002]; “Synesthetic photisms influence visual per-
ception” [Smilek et al., 2001]; “Psychophysical investi-
gations into the neural basis of synesthesia” [Ra-
machandran and Hubbard, 2001]).
Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001), for example,
published a study showing that synesthetes could per-
ceptually group graphemes according to their synes-
thetic colors. Smilek et al. (2001) and Palmeri et al.
(2002) demonstrated that synesthetic colors could in-
fluence the ease with which targets could be found in
visual search. Blake et al. (2005) even showed that ach-
romatic graphemes can trigger colored, orientation-
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fect. One of the central objectives of all of this research b
was to demonstrate that synesthetes performed cogni- t
tive tasks with black and white stimuli in much the
same way that nonsynesthetes performed these same b
tasks using colored stimuli. The conclusions were t
therefore that synesthesia was a “perceptual” phe- t
nomenon. t
Interestingly, though, all of these studies were con- m
ducted on synesthetes who experience their colors in s
external space (synesthetes whom we would call pro- p
jectors, and whom Hubbard et al. have referred to as b
lower synesthetes). A recurring question that was f
hinted at in the literature but never empirically ad- a
dressed was whether all synesthetes would show these t
perceptual influences of synesthetic colors. One won- p
ders whether or not there might be individual differ- b
ences among synesthetes and, if there were individual s
differences among grapheme-color synesthetes, what s
the nature of these differences would be. For instance, i
would projectors differ from associators, and would i
some projectors even differ from other projectors? c
The study by Hubbard et al. provides compelling evi- g
dence that one grapheme-color synesthete can be very n
different from another grapheme-color synesthete and i
that not all synesthetes will show these “perceptual” p
effects. These individual differences are most salient in n
the perceptual crowding experiment (experiment 2) re-
ported by Hubbard et al. In that experiment, target dig- t
its were presented in the periphery and were flanked s
by other digits (e.g., a 4 surrounded by 2s). The idea s
was that for synesthetes the synesthetic color of the H
target would provide an extra cue as to its identity and o
circumvent the effects of perceptual crowding that b
would be experienced by the nonsynesthetes who did g
not have this extra color cue. The important finding was d
that not all synesthetes performed better than controls f
on this task. Analyses of individual synesthetes re- s
vealed that three of the synesthetes significantly out- s
performed controls on the perceptual crowding task, t
whereas the other three were indistinguishable from u
controls. Furthermore, the performance of the synes-
thetes on these perceptual tasks was correlated with
MfMRI responses in retinotopic visual areas showing that
Sthe individual differences in behavior were not simply
an artifact of the behavioral task. D
What does this mean for the study of grapheme-color U
synesthesia? First, in our view, failing to be cognizant W
of these individual differences will lead to synesthesia C
research being characterized by failures to replicate.
For instance, consider again the perceptual crowding
experiment reported by Hubbard et al. An inspection of S
their Figure 2 shows that the synesthete JAC performed
much better than control participants, while the synes- B
tthete CHP performed nominally worse than control
aparticipants. Now imagine that JAC was tested by one
laboratory and that these researchers published this C
Einteresting finding. Intrigued by this finding, a second
laboratory might seek to replicate this experiment using D
4the exact same task but a different synesthetic subject
(synesthete CHP). Because CHP would not show the D
hsame effects as JAC, researchers could question the
replicability of the initial finding. In reality, however, E
ithe difference in these hypothetical results would haveccurred not because JAC’s effects were not reliable,
ut because there are stable individual differences be-
ween synesthetes.
Second, the findings reported in the article by Hub-
ard et al. suggest that, if synesthetes of different sub-
ypes are pooled, and their performance on certain
asks is evaluated in terms of group effects, the synes-
hetes as a group are going to have high variability,
aking it difficult to reject the null hypothesis when
ynesthetes are compared to controls. Highlighting this
oint, in the perceptual crowding experiment reported
y Hubbard et al. only three of the six synesthetes per-
ormed significantly better than control participants,
nd when the data from all six synesthetes were pooled
ogether and the synesthetes as a group were com-
ared to controls, there was no significant difference
etween synesthetes and nonsynesthetes. Based on
uch a group comparison, one might conclude that
ynesthetes perform no differently on perceptual crowd-
ng tasks than do nonsynesthetes. The analysis of the
ndividual data clearly shows, however, that such a con-
lusion would be incorrect, as there is clearly a sub-
roup of synesthetes who perform very differently than
onsynesthetes. Thus, the study nicely shows that rely-
ng on group analyses alone would lead researchers to
otentially miss very important findings and draw erro-
eous conclusions.
In our view, the Hubbard et al. study is a fine illustra-
ion of how far synesthesia research has come. Re-
earch has moved beyond studies designed to demon-
trate that synesthesia is a “real” phenomenon. The
ubbard et al. study is a cognitive neuroscience assay
f synesthesia that uses converging evidence from
oth behavioral paradigms (performance on the textual
rouping and perceptual crowding tasks) and fMRI to
emonstrate that there are fine-grained individual dif-
erences in grapheme-color synesthesia. Their conclu-
ions are important ones. Not all grapheme-color
ynesthetes are the same, and to treat them as though
hey come from a homogeneous group will lead to fail-
res to replicate and erroneous conclusions.
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